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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HARRY J. :McCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vs-

Case No.

JOHN "\V. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAI-I STATE PRISON,

12712

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\1ENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Harry J. McCormick, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court
denying his release from the Utah State Prison upon
a Petition for 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On September 1, 1971, Harry J. McCormick filed
a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that
his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid.
The matter came on for hearing on October 28, 1971,
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, who denied
the Petition on October 28, 1971.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Harry J. :McCormick, seeks the reversal of the judgment and order of the court below.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
On April 22, 1970 in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, appellant
plead guilty to the charge of robbery as containd in the
information numbered 22153. On October 28, 1971, in
the same district a Petition for \Vrit of Habeas Corpus,
numbered 201390, was heard and denied before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. (References from the
trial transcript will be referred to as T, and references
to the Habeas Corpus hearing will be referred to as H
hereafter.)
Appellant's case was set for trial on April 22, 1970,
and he was represented by l\1r. Jay Edmonds. Mr. Edmonds informed the court that appellant had not contacted him regarding the trial until that morning, ('f. 2)
and moved to continue the case due to the lack of opportunity to confer with his client. (T. 2) After some discuss regarding this motion and a motiou to sewr
(T. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8), the court first denied Mr. Edmonds' motion for a continuance ( T. 5) and then later
granted :Mr. Edmonds' motion to sever, increased appellant's bond to $15,000.00, committed him to jail
and set a new trial date for June 9, 1970. ('l'. 8) At
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that time appellant and :Mr. Edmonds left and engaged
in a m :nute and one half conversation in the hall and returned to chambers and entered a guilty plea. ( H. 7)
Edmonds request to meet
The court acknowledged
again in chambers and stated that it was the court's understanding that appellant desired to withdraw his plea
of not guilty. (T. 8) :Mr. Edmonds inquired of appellant if he understood he had a right to a jury trial and
that he would be waiving that right by pleading guilty.
( T. 8) Appellant was asked if he understood that by
entering a plea of guilty he could be set to prison for
fi,,e years to life, and that the judge only could decide
what the sentence would be. (T. 9) He was asked if
anyone had made any promises that the judge would
be more lenient with him if he plead guilty and if anyone had threatened him to make him plead guilty. (T. 9)
"Mr. Edmonds inquired if appellant understood that by
pleading guilty he was admitting he robbed the person
named in the complaint and also inquired if appellant
did rob that person. He was asked if he understood
that he was waiving his rights to an appeal by entering
a plea of guilty. (T. 9) Appellant stated that he was
not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, (T. 9) and
that he was not suffering from any mental or physical
clef ects. ( T. IO) Mr. Edmonds asked if he understood
the questions and if he had answered them freely and
voluntarily. (T. 10)
The court then, after the plea of guilty had been
received, vacated its previous order increasing the bond
to $15,000.00 and reinstated the bond of $2,500.00 (T.

10) and referred appellant for a pre-sentence report.
(T. 11)
ARGUl\lENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY 'VAS
NOT INTELLIGENTLY AND KNO,VINGLY
ENTERED BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW
NORWAS HE PROPERLY ADVISED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS NOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF vV AIYING THEl\I.
From the record of the Change of Plea Hearing on
April 22, 1970, it is apparent that appellant was not
adequately informed of and did not knowingly and intelligently waive his fundamental constitutional rights.
The record (Exhibit 1-P) reYeals that appellant was
made aware of the fact that he had a right to a jury trial
and that by pleading guilty he was waiving that right.
( T. 8) However, the record is silent as to his other rights
that he waived by entering a plea of guilty; that is, his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and his
right to confront his accusers. Further examination of
the record of the Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing and the
transcr:pt of the Habeas Corpus Proceedings do not
reveal that petitioner was ever advised by his counsel,
l\Ir. Jay Edmonds, of his constitutional rights, or that
at the time of entry of plea that he was aware of those
rights from any other source.
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In Boykin v. Alabama, 395, U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 ( 1969), l\'Ir. Boykin entered a
plea of guilty to the offense of common-law robbery, and
after a trial by jury to determine the punishment was
sentenced to die. Before the matter came to trial, the
court <letermined that petitioner was indigent and appointed counsel to represent him. Three days later, at his
arraingrnent, petitioner plead guilty to all five indictments. So far as the record shows, the judged asked no
questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner
did not address the court. On automatic appeal the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, but the seven justices,
011 their own motion, discussed the constitutionality of
the process by which the trial judges had accepted the
defendant's guilty plea, and three of them dissented on
the ground that the record was inadequate to show that
the defendants had intelligently and knowingly pleaded
guilty.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
agreed with the three dissenting members of the Alahanrn Supreme Court and reversed. The Court recognize<l the unique importance of a guilty plea when it
said:

A plea of guilty is more than a confession
which admits that the accused did various acts;
it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but
to give judgment and determine punishment.
23 L Ed2d at 279.
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The Court further recognized three federal constitu.
tional rights ·which must appear on the record and that
the clefendant must intelligently waive:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place with a plea
of guilty in a state criminal trial. First, is the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
appl;cable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. [citation] Second, is the right to trial
by jury. [citation] Third is the right to confront one's accusers. [citation] 'Ve cannot presume a waiver of these three rights from a
silent record. 23 L. Ed. 2d at 279.
The only inquiry made of appellant before he entered his plea concerning his constitutional rights was
if he understood he had a right to a trial by jury. (H. 8)
The record does not disclose that petitioner was ever
advised of his right to confront h;s accusers, or his pri\'·
ilege against self-incrimination. Now here in the record
is it apparent that appellant intelligently waived these
fundamental constitutional rights. Considering that ap·
pellant had never been involved in any criminal pro·
ceedings previously (H. 9), except for traffic tickets,
petitioner's protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated beyond the standard of Boykin, supra, in view of the fad
that the record does not reveal that l\lr. Edmonds ever
advised petition of his constitutional rights at any stage
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the case or that petitioner had ever known of his
rights protected by the United States Constitution. As
in Buykin, supra, the judgment must be reversed.
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POINT II
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITIOX FOR A 'VRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE HIS GUILTY
PLEA 'VAS NOT VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
As Boykin, supra, specifically dealt ·with the question of whether a defendant intelligently and understandingly entered a guilty plea, several cases have dealt
with the question as to whether any fear, force or coercion had been exerted against a defendant to cause
his guilty plea to be involuntary. Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 7.J.2 (1970), Parker v. i\Torth Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970), lllcllJann v. R:.chardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), are distinguishable from Boykin, snpra, in that
they do not deal with whether a plea was intelligently
and knowingly entered after defendant was advised of
h;s constitutional rights, hut rather they were cases in
which the Yarious petitioners alleged that their respective
pleas were not voluntary since they were entered through
fear, force and coercion.
In Brady, supra, the defendant entered a guilty plea
under an indictment subjecting him to a maximum penalty of death for kidnapping, which crime was punish-
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able by death only if the jury so recommends. The defendant, although originally he had plead not guilty,
changed his plea when he learned that a co-defendant
had entered a plea of guilty and had become available
to testify against him. The defendant later challenged
the plea in a subsequent proceeding on the basis that it
was involuntary since he had entered the guilty plea in
order to avoid the death penalty. The United States Supreme Court, although it affirmed the lower court in
denying relief, did set forth a standard to determine
whether a plea is voluntary.
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty
pleas must be essentially that defined by Judge
Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit:
'"[A]plea of guilty entered by one
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value
of any commitments made to him by
the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand trial unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfull
filled or unfullfillable promises) or
perhaps promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor's busi-
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ness (e.g. bribes). [Citation] 25 L.
Ed. 2d at 760.
In Parker, McMann, and Alford, supra, the defendants

all alleged their pleas were involuntary because they
had been forced or coerced by various factors. The court
in those cases, in judging the voluntariness of the respective pleas substantially followed the Brady standard.
Petitioner asserts that the entry of his guilty plea
was indeed involuntary, having been entered after conferring with his counsel for only a minute and one-half,
(H. 7) and being assured by
Edmonds that if
petitioner were to enter a guilty plea the court would
reinstate the original bond of $2,500.00 and that there
was a good possibility of probation. (H. 7) Petitioner
testified that he was married, and was working to support a family. ( H. 7-8) Petitioner further testified that
the reason he changed his plea was that he did not want
to go to the jail and that he knew he could not make
$15,000.00 bond. (H. 8) Petitioner's testimony concerning the promise that the original bond would be reinstated if he entered a plea of guilty was confirmed immediately after entering the plea when the court did in
fact vacate the bond of $15,000.00. ( T. 11)
Petitioner maintains that the court and prosecutor
should not be allowed to use the threat of increasing
the bond in order to obtain a plea. There was no indication that petitioner intended to enter a plea before the
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bond was increased and he testified that he did in fact
enter the plea because the bond was increased. This
practice cannot be condoned by the courts and could,
and in this case did, operate as effectively to violate
his constitutional rights as the use of physical violence
against his person could have. This unfortunate incident
is contrary to the Brady standard in that it has no relationship to the business of the court or the prosecution.
The judgment must therefore be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that it is apparent
from the record that his plea of guilty was not knowingly and intelligently entered and that due to the coercion
used the plea was not voluntary.
Respectfully submitted,

F.JOHNHILL
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

